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On December 21, 2015, Defendant again requested substitute counsel and the Court denied the request finding insufficient reasons. The Court found no ill will or conflict between Defendant and his appointed counsel.

Counsel for Defendant moved the Court for a psychiatric evaluation.

On January 20, 2016, the Court ordered a psychiatric evaluation.

On February 22, 2016, this Court reviewed the competency evaluation which concluded that there is no objective evidence to indicate that the Defendant is suffering from any mental disease or defect rendering him unable to understand the nature and consequences of the court proceedings against him or unable to assist properly in his defense. The Court found Defendant to be competent. Defendant again requested substitute counsel and the Court appointed Defendant's third and present counsel. The Court vacated the trial date set a new trial date for August 2, 2016. Defense counsel filed motions for discovery and motions in limine.

On July 18, 2016, the Court set a hearing at the request of defense counsel. At the hearing, Defendant requested to represent himself. The Court ordered a second psychiatric evaluation and requested that the evaluator address whether the Defendant is mentally competent to represent himself. The Court vacated the August 2, 2016 trial date.

On September 6, 2016, the Court held a competency hearing to review the evaluation. The forensic report prepared by a forensic psychologist dated August 19, 2016 concluded that there is no objective evidence to indicate that the Defendant is suffering from any mental disease or defect rendering him unable to understand the nature and consequences of the court proceedings against him or unable to assist properly in his defense. The report further concluded that the Defendant is not able to represent himself in future court proceedings based upon Defendant's low average intellectual functioning, anxiety and general fearfulness, poor reasoning and insight. Defendant again requested substitute counsel. After inquiry, the Court denied the request for substitute counsel. The Court considered the timeliness of the motion, the reasons stated by the Defendant, and the extent of any breakdown of communication and consequent inability to present a defense. The Court concluded that the case had been significantly delayed. The Court found that the nature of the conflict asserted by the Defendant was based on the Defendant's general unreasonableness. The Court noted that present counsel had filed motions, that present counsel had conducted himself professionally, and that present counsel was more than competent to defend this case. The Court found no ill-will between present counsel and the Defendant and found no reason to conclude that the same conflicts will not arise with another counsel. Under the facts of this case, this court did not conclude that the conflict that the Defendant appears to have with his counsel was extensive or irreconcilable. The Court concluded that defense counsel can adequately represent the Defendant.

On September 8, 2016, the Court held a further status hearing. Defendant requested to represent himself and the Court took this request under submission.

On September 14, 2016, the Court held a further status hearing in order to inform the Defendant of the (1) the nature of the charges against him; (2) the possible penalties; and (3) the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Defendant continued to assert his constitutional right to self-representation.

RULING OF THE COURT

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution grants a criminal defendant the right to refuse the assistance of counsel and to represent himself in criminal proceedings. *United States v. Lopez-Osuna*, 242 F.3d 1191, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing *Faretta v. California*, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)). This right to self-representation may be overridden if: (1) the defendant does not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel, or (2) he is not "able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol." *Lopez-Osuna*, 242 F.3d at 1199 (quotation omitted). In addition, the Court has consider Defendant's mental competency to represent himself. "The standard for a defendant's mental competence to stand trial is now different from the standard for a defendant's mental competence to represent himself or herself at trial."

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United States v. Ferguson, 569 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2009). Generally, a defendant who knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waives the right to counsel must be permitted to represent himself at trial. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). However, in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 2379 (2008), the Supreme Court noted that "in certain instances an individual . . . will be able to work with counsel at trial, yet at the same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel." Id. at 2386. "Insofar as a defendant's lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence, self-representation in that exceptional context undercuts the most basic of the Constitution's criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial." Id. at 2387.

In this case, the Court fully informed the Defendant of the (1) the nature of the charges against him; (2) the possible penalties; and (3) the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. *Lopez-Osuna*, 242 F.3d at 1199. The Court advised the Defendant that a trained lawyer would defend him better than he can defend himself and that it is unwise to represent himself. Defendant informed the Court that understood the elements of the offense charged and the possible penalties. Defendant informed the Court that he was familiar with and willing to abide by the rules of evidence and procedure. Defendant repeatedly requested an opportunity to represent himself and to press his case before the Court. The Court concludes that there are no grounds upon which to deny the Defendant his right to represent himself under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant repeatedly affirmed that his waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, and unequivocal.

In this case, the Court has ordered two psychiatric evaluations of the Defendant. Each evaluator found that there is no objective evidence to indicate that the Defendant is suffering from any mental disease or defect rendering him unable to understand the nature and consequences of the court proceedings against him or unable to assist properly in his defense. Each evaluator found that the Defendant understands the various roles of the court participants and the adversarial nature of court proceedings.

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Each evaluator found that the Defendant was upset about the potential sentence he faces and the inability of his counsel to obtain a lower sentence. While the second evaluator concluded that the Defendant is not able to represent himself in future court proceedings based upon Defendant's low average intellectual functioning, anxiety and general fearfulness, poor reasoning and insight, this conclusion was not based upon any evidence of a lack of mental capacity to conduct trial proceedings. The evaluator concluded, like the Court, that it would be unwise for the Defendant unfamiliar with and untrained in the law to represent himself. Under the facts of this case, the Defendant's constitutional right to self-representation is not overridden by any mental competency limitation recognized by the United States Supreme Court in *Indiana v. Edwards*.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the request by the Defendant to represent himself in this proceeding is granted. Counsel for the Defendant will remain as advisory counsel.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will hold a status hearing on September 19, 2016 at 2 p.m.

DATED: September 14, 2016

WILLIAM Q. HAYES
United States District Judge

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